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 1 Introduction
In this paper we show that if households have hyperbolic preferences and face
staggered nominal wage contracts, in￿ ation (via money growth) has signi￿cant
long run e⁄ects on output and employment. With our baseline calibration,
which takes the length of the contract period to be 1 year, a permanent increase
in in￿ ation of 1% is associated with an increase in output and employment of
approximately 0.2% for in￿ ation rates of up to around 10%. This is roughly of
the same order of magnitude as the empirical estimates of the long-run Phillips
curve in the well-known studies that have found a signi￿cant tradeo⁄, extending
from the early contributions of Phillips (1958) and Samuelson and Solow (1960)
to the recent work of Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996, 2000), Fair (2000) and
many others. Blanchard and Fisher (1989) wrote: ￿Most economists who came
to accept the view that there was no long-run trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and
unemployment were more a⁄ected by a priori argument than by empirical evi-
dence.￿ We challenge the "a priori" arguments that the long-run Phillips curve
is necessarily vertical.
There are wide implications for macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy.
If money is no longer superneutral, unemployment cannot be decomposed into
cyclical and structural components; the concepts of an NRU or NAIRU need to
be reconsidered. A wide econometric literature identi￿es supply and demand
shocks by a decomposition into permanent and transient e⁄ects. This too be-
comes questionable if in￿ ation has permanent e⁄ects on real variables. In terms
of policy, the presence of a non-vertical Phillips curve adds an extra degree of
complexity to the policymaker￿ s task.
Our model is a standard dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered
nominal contracts. Our only unconventional assumption is that households have
hyperbolic preferences. Instead of a constant rate of time preference, we model
households as showing a strong preference for a payo⁄ today over a payo⁄ to-
morrow, but a much weaker preference for a payo⁄ in a year￿ s time over a payo⁄
in a year and a day￿ s time. Our analysis here rests heavily on the seminal work
of Laibson (1996) and Barro (1999).
There are three channels by which in￿ ation has long-run e⁄ects on real vari-
ables in our model:
(i) The employment cycling e⁄ect: As in￿ ation increases, relative prices be-
come more volatile and thus the price allocation system works less e¢ ciently.
Our analysis captures this phenomenon through ￿ uctuations in real wages, since
nominal wages are constant over the contract period while the price level rises
2continually in an in￿ ationary steady state. The greater the in￿ ation rate, the
more volatile real wages and employment become. Since this employment cycling
(￿rms substituting towards labor with relatively low real wages) is ine¢ cient, the
productivity of labor falls, reducing labor demanded and output supplied.
(ii) The labor smoothing e⁄ect: When households have a preference for smooth-
ing their labor services through time, employment cycling increases their disu-
tility of labor, thereby inducing households to reduce their labor supply.
(iii) The discounting e⁄ect: Time discounting reduces the weight of house-
holds￿future disutility of labor. If nominal wages are constant over the contract
period, more in￿ ation means a greater fall in real wages, and a greater rise in
employment and the disutility of labor over the contract period. The more the
future disutility of labor is discounted, the less onerous labor becomes and the
more labor is supplied.
Whereas the ￿rst and second e⁄ects generate a negative relation between
in￿ ation and macro activities (aggregate employment and output), the third
gives rise to a positive relation. We show that the discounting e⁄ect dominates
for in￿ ation rates less than 10 percent.
That discounting leads to a non-vertical Phillips curve in new Keynesian
models is well-known1, however with the discount factor pinned down by the
real interest rate, the e⁄ect remains small (Ascari, 1998, Graham and Snower,
2003). A model with hyperbolic discounting has agents discounting payo⁄s in
the near future at a very high rate (discount factors of 60% or 70% are common
in the literature) while matching the observed real interest rate (Barro, 1999
refers to this as "observational equivalence"). It is these high discount factors
which apply to the wage setting decision, so our model signi￿cantly ampli￿es the
discounting e⁄ect.
Our calibrations indicate that, with hyperbolic discounting, the discounting
e⁄ect is dominant at in￿ ation rates less than 10%. Thus the relation between
in￿ ation (on the one hand) and employment and output (on the other) is signif-
icantly upward-sloping over this range.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with preliminaries: the
relation of our analysis to the literature and a discussion of our central assump-
1Such a discounting e⁄ect is present in the new Keynesian Phillips curve based on Calvo
pricing
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt






3tion: hyperbolic discounting. Section 3 presents our model and its calibration.
Section 4 gives some results along with sensitivity analysis to key parameters.
In section 5 we discuss the key assumptions of ￿xed contract length and no
indexation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Relation to the Literature
Our analysis relates to the existing literature in two distinct ways. First, the
numerical results of our model are derived from calibrated parameters that are
standard in the New Phillips Curve models. Our only novel assumption in
this context is hyperbolic discounting, and our calibrations in that respect are
standard as well. Second, our results are in line with a growing body of empirical
macroeconomic evidence.
The existing empirical evidence on the slope of the long-run Phillips curve
has been mixed for some time, and has led major contributors such as Mankiw
(2001) to be "agnostic" on the issue. Given economists￿predilection for the
classical dichotomy, it is striking how many empirical studies reject it. In recent
years, there has been a rapidly growing literature ￿nding empirical evidence for
a long-run tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity.
Ball (1997) shows that countries experiencing large and long declines in in-
￿ ation tend also to encounter comparatively large increases in their NAIRUs.
Ball (1999) suggests that such a relationship may be due to monetary policy:
countries with relatively contractionary policy in the 1980s tended to have rela-
tively large increases in their NAIRUs. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996, 2000),
looking at data for the US ￿nd empirical evidence of a long-run tradeo⁄ at low
in￿ ation rates. Lundborg and Sacklen (2001) apply a small open-economy ver-
sion of this model to Swedish data and ￿nd a negative long-run relationship
between in￿ ation and unemployment.
Dolado, L￿pez-Salido and Vega (2000) ￿nd some evidence of a permanent
tradeo⁄ over the entire in￿ ation range for Spain using a data set running from
1964 - 1995. Fisher and Seater (1993) and Fair (2000) ￿nd long-run tradeo⁄s as
well. King and Watson (1994) ￿nd that the estimated long-run trado⁄ depends
on short-run identi￿cation assumptions. Ericsson, Irons and Tryon (2001) ￿nd a
positive long-run relation between output and in￿ ation for most G-7 countries.
Gottschalk and Fritsche (2005) ￿nd a strong negative correlation between the
trend components of in￿ ation and unemployment for West Germany. Schreiber
and Wolters (2005) use a VAR cointegration analysis to ￿nd a negative long-run
4relation between in￿ ation and unemployment for Germany, robust with respect
to speci￿cation variations. For post-WWII data of the Canadian economy, Kous-
tas (1998) and Koustas and Voloce (1996) ￿nd that the evidence strongly rejects
the vertical long-run Phillips curve. Furthermore, using data covering the last
30-40 years for Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Swe-
den and the UK, Koutas and Serletis (2003) present evidence against a vertical
long-run Phillips curve.
An important strand of the recent literature seeks to derive the Phillips
curve tradeo⁄from structural macro models, arguing that the traditional single-
equation models cannot fully capture the various important causal relations un-
derlying the Phillips curve. Bullard and Keating (1995) use a structural VAR to
estimate the long-run response of output to a permanent increase for a group of
16 countries. There point estimates of the response are positive for 10 countries
in the sample. Of these, the responses are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at
a 90% con￿dence interval for 5 countries (including the UK, Austria and Ger-
many), and at a 5% con￿dence level for 2 more (Japan and Spain). Ahmed and
Rogers (1998) ￿nd long-run e⁄ects of in￿ ation on consumption, investment and
output are positive, on the basis of 100 years of U.S. data.2 In the context of a
small structural rational expectations model, Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland
(2004) show how a zero bound on nominal interest rates a positive relation be-
tween in￿ ation and the output gap at low in￿ ation rates. Karanassou, Sala and
Snower (2003, 2005) ￿nd evidence of a signi￿cant negative relation between in-
￿ ation and unemployment in the context of estimated labor market systems for
the U.S. and the E.U.
Our analysis contributes to a larger theoretical literature rationalizing a long-
run tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and macro activity. It is well-known that the
superneutrality result of Sidrauski (1967) depends on a number of strong as-
sumptions, such as the separability of consumption and leisure in utility. The
long-run e⁄ect of money growth on macro activity can be shown to depend on
the nature of household preferences and the role of money in the economy (Or-
phanides and Solow (1990) provide a survey). This suggests that the slope of
the long-run Phillips curve is not necessarily vertical and its sign is an empirical
issue. Our rationale for the long-run Phillips curve, by contrast, does not rest
on non-separable utility functions, cash-in-advance, or money in the production
function.
2Speci￿cally, they estimate the e⁄ects of exogenous changes in the long-run component of
in￿ ation on aggregate consumption, investment and output, in the context of a fully identi￿ed
structural vector error correction model.
5Several authors (e.g. Ascari (2000, 2003) have shown that the Phillips curve
derived from New Keynesian microfoundations is highly nonlinear, with a pos-
itive relation between in￿ ation and macro activity at low in￿ ation rates and a
negative relation at high in￿ ation rates. In contrast to our analysis, however,
the discounting e⁄ect is not strong in these models
In the context of a state-dependent menu cost model, Benabou and Konieczny
(1994) show how the long-run Phillips curve tradeo⁄ depends on the asymme-
try of the pro￿t function, the convexity of the product demand function, and
discounting. Konieczny (1990), Kuran (1986) and Naish (1986) provide non-
neutrality results in a broadly similar vein. Our model, by contrast, has time-
dependent nominal rigidities.
Our analysis is in some respects similar to the work of Akerlof, Dickens
and Perry (1996, 2000) who show that the Phillips curve becomes downward
sloping at in￿ ation rates below 3 - 4% when there are departures from rational
expectations or permanent nominal rigidities. In contrast, we show that the
long run tradeo⁄ exists with rational expectations and only temporary nominal
rigidities. Our analysis is observationally distinct from that of Akerlof et al.
(1996), since our calibrations (below) imply a positive tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation
and macroeconomic activity even when in￿ ation is substantially higher than 3-4
percent.
Further rationales for a long-run Phillips curve tradeo⁄ are given by Holden
(2003) and Hughes-Hallett (2000). Holden (2003) shows how a non-superneutrality
of money can arise at low in￿ ation rates when the nominal wage can be changed
only by mutual consent in wage negotiations. Hughes-Hallett (2000) shows how a
long-run tradeo⁄between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity can arise through
aggregation over sectoral / regional Phillips curves with heterogenous short-run
slopes. Our analysis does not rely on such strategic considerations or aggregation
issues.
2.2 Hyperbolic discounting
The assumption of a constant rate of time preference is generally adopted for
analytical convenience, but a convincing underlying rationale for it has not been
articulated,3 and it is at odds with the available empirical evidence which sug-
gests that rates of time preference, viewed from the present moment, are high in
the short run but much lower in the long run.4 For example, people much prefer
3Axiomatic derivations are given by Koopmans (1960) and Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982).
4See, for example, Ainslie (1992), Loewenstein and Thaler (1989), and Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992). Strotz (1956) was the ￿rst economist to study the implications of discount rates
6$1000 today than that sum in a month from now, while their relative valuation
is much more evenly balanced when they have to choose between $1000 in a year
from now versus that sum in a year and a month. The observed time-varying
discount rates can be captured by hyperbolic discount functions, in which events
in ￿ periods are discounted with factor (1 + ￿￿)
￿￿=￿ ; where ￿ and ￿ are positive
constants.5
When discount rates vary through time, households have a time - inconsis-
tency problem: households make their current decisions on the basis of prefer-
ences displaying low time discount rates for intertemporal choices lying in the
distant future; but once the future becomes the present, these households have
a much higher degree of impatience. Such time inconsistent preferences can be
modeled with standard game-theoretic tools as an intra-personal game, in which
today￿ s self is an independent player from each of the future selves. Today￿ s
self maximizes its utility, from today onwards into the future, knowing that the
future selves will make decisions based on di⁄erent preferences. The decisions of
today￿ s self a⁄ects the future selves; in particular, today￿ s consumption deter-
mines the wealth that will be bequeathed to the future selves. Also, the decisions
of the future selves a⁄ect today￿ s self; in particular, future consumption a⁄ects
the utility of today￿ s self, because today￿ s self maximizes its utility over the
present and future. The equilibrium of the intertemporal game played among a
household￿ s selves is a Nash equilibrium, based on this intertemporal consistency
of behaviors of the household￿ s selves.
There is a rapidly growing literature that uses time-varying discount rates
to explain a wide variety of other economic behaviors, including procrastination,
retirement saving, self-deception, self-control, etc.6.
A key feature of hyperbolic preferences is "observational equivalence" (Barro,
1999): in a model with hyperbolic discounting the e⁄ective rate of time preference
(after solving for the Nash equilibrium of the household) is constant and the
discounting parameters can be chosen in such a way as to match observed values
of the real interest rate.
that decrease with the time horizon.
5See Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Simpler hyperbolic discount functions, such as 1=￿
and 1=(1 + ￿￿), are used in the psychology literature (e.g. Chung and Herrnstein (1961) and
Ainslie (1992)).
6See, for example, Akerlof (1991), Benabou and Tirole (2002, 2004), Carrillo and Marriotti
(2000), Diamond and Koszegi (2003), and O￿ Donoghou and Rabin (1999a,b), Laibson, Repetto,
and Tobacman (2001)
73 The Model
We present a simple dynamic general equilibrium model consisting of three types
of agent: households, ￿rms and a government.
There is a continuum of households which supply di⁄erentiated labour to
￿rms, consume goods, and hold money balances and bonds. Each household
sets its nominal wage, given the demand for its services. In the spirit of Taylor
(1979), we group households into N wage-setting cohorts, each of which sets a
nominal wage contract for N periods. Di⁄erent cohorts set wages at di⁄erent
times, uniformly staggered7.
Firms produce a homogeneous consumption good through di⁄erentiated labour.
The government prints money and real bonds, and rebates the seigniorage pro-
ceeds to households as a lump sum.
3.1 Firms
The representative ￿rm uses all types of labour in a production function with a
constant elasticity of substitution (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) to produce a ho-















where yt is output, lt (h) is the amount of labour chosen from household h, and
￿ is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent labour types.
There is perfect competition in the product market. The ￿rm￿ s cost-minimization
7Another possibility, and one widely used in the literature, is to use Calvo contracts. How-
ever for su¢ ciently high levels of money growth, Calvo contracts are not appropriate. The
reason is straightforward. With Calvo contracts, some households keep their nominal wage
unchanged for a very long period of time, which means that, in the presence of in￿ ation, the
real value of this wage approaches zero. This implies that the ￿rm will wish to hire as much
of the labor of these households as possible, and as little of the other households. This is
very ine¢ cient so output approaches zero. Bakshi et al (2002) report that this happens with
in￿ ation of 5.5%; Ascari (2003) at somewhat higher levels.
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yt+i : 0 < i < N ￿ 1;t = kN (2)
where W(h) is the wage set by household h and the aggregate wage index in













Given that ￿rms are perfect competitors their markup will be zero so that the
real wage is constant and equal to unity W = P.
3.2 Households
Households consume, supply di⁄erentiated labour and hold money balances and
bonds. A household h, which resets its wage in period t, faces a budget constraint




















where ct is consumption, Wt the nominal contract wage, Mt nominal money
holdings, Pt the aggregate price index, R the gross real interest rate (assumed
constant) on bond holdings Bt; Tt net lump-sum transfers from government and
￿ (h) an income tax which we will allow to vary across households. The left-hand
side represents spending on consumption and closing real money balances and
bonds; the right hand side represents income from labour, pro￿ts and opening
bond and money holdings net of taxes.
Household preferences are given by
Ut (h) = u(ct (h);lt (h);mt (h)) + ￿
1 X
i=1
￿iu(ct+i (h);lt+i (h);mt+i (h)) (5)
where mt (h) =
Mt(h)
Pt are the household￿ s real money balances.
Following Laibson (1996) and much of the subsequent literature, for analyt-
ical convenience we have approximated the hyperbolic discount function by a
"quasi-hyperbolic" discount function in which the discount factors from the per-
spective of the current period are 1;￿￿;￿￿2;￿￿3::::. The discount factor between
9the ￿rst two periods is ￿￿; but that between all subsequent periods is ￿. Thus
we can think of ￿ as a short-run discount factor, and ￿ as a long-run discount
factor.
We choose a single-period utility function that has desirable long-run prop-
erties (see King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)):
u(ct (h);lt (h);mt (h)) = logct (h) + ￿l
(1 ￿ lt (h))
1￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿m logmt (h) (6)
where ￿l, ￿m, and ￿ are positive constants: ￿ is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of leisure. We assume the household writes nominal wage contracts
which last for N periods9.
When the discount rate is time-varying, the household￿ s behavior is time-
inconsistent: in future periods the household will have an incentive to change
plans made in the current period. Since household cannot commit itself to a
plan beyond the current period and since a household with rational expectations
will take this into account when making its decisions, it is standard practice
(e.g. Laibson, 1996) to formulate the household￿ s problem as a game played by
the household at time t (self t) against the household in future periods (future
selves).
In the appendix, we show that the unique equilibrium strategy st (h) in this
game of a household with preferences given by (5) facing constraints (4) and (2)
is a choice of consumption ct (h), real money balances mt (h), and, at the start
of each contract period, a choice of the nominal wage Wt (h) to be kept ￿xed for
the next N periods,
st (h) = fct (h);mt (h)g : t 6= kN (7)
st (h) = fct (h);W￿
t (h);mt (h)g : t = kN (8)
where the nominal reset wage (i.e. the nominal wage at the beginning of the





(1 ￿ lt (h))
￿￿ lt (h) + ￿
N￿1 P
i=1









9We do not allow indexation within the contract period. We disucss the empirical plausi-
bility of this assumption in section 5.














lt+i (h) + a0 (h)
3
5 (10)



































where ￿t is any net revenue from the income tax.
A resource constraint closes the model.
Yt = Ct (13)






A competitive equilibrium for the above economy is a sequence of plans for
￿ allocations of households fc￿




￿ aggregate labour input fltgt=1:1
such that
1. Given prices, the allocations are Nash equilibria of the game-theoretic prob-
lem of each household (and hence solve the utility maximization problem)
10Note that the variables Bt;Mt; and Tt are not to be confused with the household￿ s holdings
Bt (h);Mt (h); and Tt (h).
112. fWtgt=1:1 is the marginal product of aggregate labour
3. All markets clear
3.5 The steady state
For the remainder of the paper we consider the properties of a symmetric steady
state in which all household behave identically. We can then think of our
model as consisting of N agents, one from each cohort. Each agent faces an
identical problem so chooses the same wage (in real terms) when they can reset
it. This means the present value of labour income over the contract period
is the same for each agent, and (10) means that they each consume the same
constant proportion of their lifetime wealth in each period. Although the present
value of labour income over the contract is the same for every agent, the present
value of lifetime wealth is slightly di⁄erent since at the start of time, di⁄erent
cohorts start in di⁄erent periods of their contracts with di⁄erent incomes. We
can choose the income tax rate to equalise the present value of lifetime wealth
across cohorts, so all agents consume the same amount. Since each agent￿ s path
of income falls across the contract period, agents in di⁄erent cohorts trade bonds
to smooth consumption11.
In the steady state, the money growth rate is constant and equal to the rate


















Combining (9) and (10) gives a labour supply relation for each household
(1 ￿ lt (h))
￿￿ lt (h) + ￿
N￿1 X
i=1
￿i (1 ￿ lt+i (h))
￿￿ lt+i (h) =
(￿ ￿ 1)(R ￿ 1)
￿l￿
(17)
This sets the present value of the marginal disutility of labour with respect to
the wage (on the left-hand side) equal to the present value of the marginal utility
of the extra consumption resulting from a higher wage (on the right-hand side).
11Were we to model o⁄-steady state behaviour, we would need to invoke some form of con-
sumption insurance to deal with the consequent heterogeneity as in, for example, Huang, Liu
and Phaneuf (2004).
12Due to consumption smoothing, the right-hand side is constant since an increase
in the wage leads one-for-one to an increase in consumption and thus a fall in
its marginal utility.
Then (2), (16) and (17) fully describe the system and allow us to solve for
output and aggregate employment.
This steady state satis￿es condition (1) for an equilibrium by construction.
Competitive factor markets ensure condition (2) holds and that the labour mar-
ket clears. Given consumption of all households is identical, it is straightforward
to show the goods market and bond market clears.
3.6 Calibration
We calibrate our model with standard values. For the elasticity of labour sub-
stitution, ￿, we choose a value of 5.12 We take the length of a contract to be
one year, following Taylor (1998), and assume it remains constant as in￿ ation
varies. We discuss the empirical rationale for this in detail in section 5. There
are two wage-setting cohorts (N = 2), so that every six months one cohort sets
its nominal wage and then keeps it ￿xed for a year. We take ￿, the parameter
measuring the size of short-run subjective discounting to be 70%. Values of
between 60% and 70% are standard in the hyperbolic discounting literature, for
example Laibson (1996), based on empirical evidence such as Ainslie (1992). In




￿ (R ￿ 1)
(18)
We set the annual real interest rate to 4%, which, along with our value for ￿,
ties down the household￿ s long-term discounting parameter, ￿, which is 0:986.
We take households￿preferences over leisure to be logs, ￿ = 1. In Section 4.4
we analyze the sensitivity of our results to changes in all these variables.
We choose ￿l to be 2:85 which gives, from (17), steady state labour of 0.22
corresponding to 48 weeks of 40 hours worked per year. The value of ￿m af-
fects the level of real money balances held by the household but since utility is
separable in real money balances, this does not a⁄ect our results.
4 Results
Figure 1 shows how aggregate steady state employment and output changes with
in￿ ation. Both employment and output increase monotonically with in￿ ation at
12Erceg et al (2000) use a value of 4; Huang and Liu (2002) use 6.
13approximately the same rate in the long run, though the output line lies every-
where below the employment line (for reasons elucidated below). Over the range
of in￿ ation analyzed, the relation is close to linear, with a 1% increase in in￿ ation
















Figure 1: The steady state relation between real variables and
in￿ ation
x-axis shows annualized in￿ ation; y-axis percent deviations of real variables from their
values at zero-in￿ ation
There are three channels by which in￿ ation a⁄ects real variables in this model
which we call employment cycling, discounting and labour supply smoothing.
We consider these in turn to explain the form of the Phillips curve in ￿gure 1,
and how this form depends on our chosen parameter values.
4.1 Employment cycling
For the two wage-setting cohorts (N = 2), let cohort 1 set its wage at time t
while cohort 2 sets its wage at time t + 1 and each nominal contract wage is
set for two periods. Suppose that steady-state in￿ ation is positive. Since the
price level rises from period to period whereas each cohort￿ s nominal wage is
readjusted every second period, it follows that each cohort￿ s real wage is high
at the beginning of its contract period and low at the end of it. Speci￿cally, at
time t, the real wage of cohort 1 is high and that of cohort 2 is low, and vice
versa at time t + 1. This is a simple way of capturing the empirical regularity
that as in￿ ation increases, relative prices become less stable.
14Thus, the ￿rm at time t has a relatively low demand for cohort 1 and relatively
high demand for cohort 2, and vice versa at time t+1. This substitution towards
labour types with low real wages (and away from labour types with high real
wages) we call employment cycling.13. It is straightforward to show that the
degree of employment cycling is a function only of the in￿ ation rate and the




Since di⁄erent labour types are imperfectly substitutable, employment cy-
cling is ine¢ cient in the sense that, for given aggregate employment l, more
employment cycling is associated with lower aggregate output. The greater is
steady-state in￿ ation rate, the more employment cycling ￿rms do, and thus the
lower the average productivity of labour. So output always increases by less than
employment as in￿ ation rises, and the output line lies below the employment line
in ￿gure 1. This captures the empirical regularity that as in￿ ation increases,
relative prices become less stable and this instability is a source of ine¢ ciency.
Employment cycling is familiar from the new Keynesian literature on optimal
monetary policy. For Woodford (2003) cycling between di⁄erent types of labour
is the key distortion which leads to a stabilising role for monetary policy.
4.2 Labour smoothing
The labour-supply smoothing e⁄ect occurs when ￿ is positive. Due to employ-
ment cycling, individual households cannot provide a constant stream of labour
services through time. Since with nonzero ￿ the marginal disutility of labour
rises with labour, these ￿ uctuations in hours worked makes them worse o⁄.
In response, they supply less labour at a given wage over the contract period.
Greater money growth leads to greater employment cycling, and thus lower aver-
age labour supply and, via the production function, lower output. In this way, the
labour-supply smoothing e⁄ect weakens the steady-state employment-in￿ ation
tradeo⁄ and, via the production function, the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄.
13At the levels of in￿ ation relevant to our recent macroeconomic experience, the degree of
employment cycling is quite small: at 2% in￿ ation, employment ￿ uctuates around its mean
value by 2.5%. But at 10% in￿ ation this ￿ uctuation rises to 16%. In practice, employment
cycling is of course much more likely to occur in form of hours variations than through hiring
and ￿ring. There is evidence that overtime work is sensitive to the wage, and thus it seems
plausible that a limited degree of employment cycling may occur when a signi￿cant degree of
in￿ ation occurs over the contract period.
154.3 Discounting
The discounting e⁄ect may be understood intuitively through the following steps:
1. The labour supply relation (17), households set their contract wage so
that the present value over the contract period of the marginal disutility of
labor (MDL) with respect to the wage is equal to the present value of the
marginal utility of consumption (MUC) from the labor income generated
by a wage change.
2. When in￿ ation is positive, labor supply increases over the contract period
because of employment cycling and thus the MDL increases over the con-
tract period. By contrast, the MUC remains constant through time, due
to consumption smoothing.
3. Due to discounting, future marginal utilities and disutilities receive less
weight than current ones. Since the MDL increases over the contract
period whereas the MUC remains constant, an increase in discounting
reduces the present value of the MDL relative to the present value of the
MUC. In response, the household raises its labor supply thereby raising
the present value of the MDL to bring the two present values back into
equality. So, given in￿ ation, as the discount rate increases, labour supply
increases.
4. An increase in in￿ ation means employment cycling gets stronger so the
MDL increases more over the contract period and the more the discounting
e⁄ect reduces the present value of the MDL relative to the present value
of the MUC. Consequently the household increases its labor supply to
bring the two present values back into equality. So, given discounting, as
the in￿ ation rate increases, labour supply increases.
Whereas the employment cycling e⁄ect and the labor smoothing e⁄ect gen-
erate an inverse relation between in￿ ation and macro activity, the discounting
e⁄ect generates a positive relation. For the calibration above, as Fig. 1 shows,
the discounting e⁄ect is dominant for in￿ ation rates less than 10 percent.
Barro (1999) showed that, in the absence of nominal contracting rigidities, an
economy with hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to one with
exponential discounting in the sense that the equilibrium in an economy with
hyperbolic discounters coincides with that in an economy with exponential dis-
counters for a particular choice of the exponential discount factor. Our model
depends on this observational equivalence with respect to the real interest rate,
16but observational equivalence is violated for other variables due to the existence
of multi-period nominal contracts. To see this, note that the denominator of
(9) is a ￿ ow of (marginal) income so is discounted exponentially, whereas the
numerator is a ￿ ow of marginal utility, which is discounted at the subjective
rate of time preference, i.e. hyperbolically. If contracts were only one period
long (N = 1) - as is implicitly assumed in models without nominal contract-
ing rigidities - neither the marginal disutility of labour nor the marginal utility
of consumption would be discounted. However when N > 1, the di⁄erence
between the discounting of the denominator and the numerator breaks observa-
tional equivalence.
4.4 Sensitivities
For comparison, we ￿rst present the results of our model with standard expo-
nential discounting. Figure 2 shows the trade-o⁄ between real variables and













Figure 2: The steady state relation between real variables and
in￿ ation with exponential discounting
x-axis shows annualized in￿ ation; y-axis percent deviations of real variables from their
values at zero-in￿ ation
With exponential discounting, the discounting e⁄ect is very weak and the
other two e⁄ects, both of which lead to a negative relation between output and
in￿ ation, dominate.
17Table 1 shows how the strength of the discounting e⁄ect, and hence the
extent of the monetary non-superneutrality, varies with the size of the discount
factor. The lower ￿, the higher is the rate at which household￿ s discount the
future, so the stronger is the discounting e⁄ect and the greater is the long-run
employment increase resulting from a given long-run rise in money growth. In
the hyperbolic discounting literature, values of 60% and 70% for the short-term
discounting parameter are common.
Table 1: Sensitivity to the short-run discount rate ￿
￿ increases from 2% to 3% ￿ increases from 6% to 7%
￿ Employment Output Employment Output
90% 0.05% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00%
80% 0.13% 0.12% 0.09% 0.07%
70% 0.21% 0.20% 0.17% 0.15%
60% 0.30% 0.29% 0.26% 0.24%
Though we have assumed that there are only two wage-setting cohorts (N =
2) to simplify our presentation, it is worth noting that using higher values has a
negligible e⁄ect on our results.14
How does the tradeo⁄ change with di⁄erent values for ￿, the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution of leisure? Figure 3 shows these tradeo⁄s for ￿ =
2, the value used in Chari et al (1996) and for a higher value ￿ = 5. This
contrasts with ￿gure 1 in two ways. Firstly, the tradeo⁄is weaker, the change in
employment if in￿ ation is increased from 0% to 5% is reduced by approximately
a third for ￿ = 2 and a half for ￿ = 5. Secondly, the curves become noticeably
non-linear: as in￿ ation increases, the degree of employment cycling increases and
so to does the strength of the labour-supply smoothing e⁄ect. Thus the tradeo⁄
gets weaker as in￿ ation increases.
14We have also made assumptions about technology and preferences. If we allow the pro-
duction function to show diminishing returns to aggregate labour, the e⁄ect on employment
is unchanged but output responds more weakly. Using a power function for labour with an
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Figure 3: The steady state relation between real variables and
in￿ ation: sensitivity to ￿
x-axis shows annualized in￿ ation; y-axis percent deviations of real variables from their
values at zero-in￿ ation
The parameter ￿ measures the degree of substitutability between di⁄erent
labour types in the ￿rm￿ s production function. Low ￿ means that labour types
are poor substitutes; high ￿ means that they are good substitutes. Increasing ￿
has three e⁄ects. First, di⁄erent labour types become closer substitutes and thus
a given amount of employment cycling is associated with higher output. In other
words, holding the degree of employment cycling constant, an increase in ￿ raises
output. Second, an increase in ￿ induces the ￿rm to raise employment cycling,
since it is now less costly to substitute among labour types over the contract
period. For a given level of aggregate employment, an increase in employment
cycling leads to a fall in output, since di⁄erent labour types are imperfect substi-
tutes. For the above calibrations of the other parameters, it turns out that for
all but very low rates of in￿ ation, the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst and the
output curve lies further below the employment curve as ￿ increases. Thirdly,
the greater is the degree of cycling, the stronger is the discounting e⁄ect so the
lower is the wage and the higher the level of employment and output for a given
level of in￿ ation.
Table 2 shows the e⁄ects of a 1% increase in in￿ ation on output and em-
ployment. Because of the non-linear nature of the relation, we show the e⁄ect
starting from two base values of 2% in￿ ation and 6% in￿ ation.
Table 2: Sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution between labour
19types ￿
Change in real variables from an increase in steady state in￿ ation
￿ increases from 2% to 3% ￿ increases from 6% to 7%
￿ Employment Output Employment Output
1.01 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
2 0.09% 0.08% 0.08% 0.07%
5 0.21% 0.20% 0.17% 0.15%
10 0.37% 0.35% 0.23% 0.19%
The literature gives little guide as to what value of ￿ is appropriate for ag-
gregate data. The elasticity of substitution between labour types de￿ned by
occupations and seniority may be low in some instances, but economy-wide oc-
cupational unions are rare, while seniority-based unions are absent. In most
market economies nowadays, wage-setting cohorts usually comprise a wide rage
of occupations and seniority scales, so that the cohorts are presumably highly
substitutable for one another. Thus high values of ￿, e.g. values well above 5,
appear plausible in our analytical setting.
Table 3 shows how the slope of the tradeo⁄ varies with the contract length.
As the contract length increases, our e⁄ect becomes more pronounced, since the
degree of employment variation over the contract becomes greater. In response
to this, the labour supply smoothing e⁄ect becomes stronger at higher levels of
in￿ ation, and so the relation becomes more non-linear.
20Table 3: Sensitivity to the contract length
Change in real variables from an increase in steady state in￿ ation
￿ increases from 2% to 3% ￿ increases from 6% to 7%
Contract (years) Employment Output Employment Output
0.5 0.10% 0.10% 0.09% 0.09%
1 0.21% 0.20% 0.17% 0.15%
1.5 0.30% 0.28% 0.22% 0.17%
2 0.39% 0.36% 0.24% 0.17%
It is worth noting that our choice of parameters is based on estimates in the
literature, rather than derived from a relationship between output / employment
and in￿ ation that we estimate ourselves. Since this relationship can be estimated
in a wide variety of ways and is subject to considerable, ongoing controversy, we
deem it to be wiser - given our present state of knowledge - to present our results
for a wide range of plausible values for the relevant parameter values. This has
been done above and we have seen that a positive long-run relation between
in￿ ation and output/employment emerges over this wide range of values, at
moderate in￿ ation rates.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss the validity of our underlying assumptions and draw out
some empirical implications of our model. Apart from hyperbolic discounting,
the evidence for which we have discussed above, our central results rest on two
key assumptions: that wages are set annually in nominal terms, and that within
this contract period of one year there is no indexation.
When thinking about the nature of wage contracts it is important to distin-
guish between unionised and non-unionised workers. Taylor (1998), reviewing
the direct empirical evidence for the unionised sector in the US, cites a large
number of studies that suggests that annual contracts are the most common
length of wage setting interval. The wide variation across countries is captured
by Groth and Johansson (2004) who update the study of Bruno and Sachs (1985)
with data from 1985 - 1995. They assign countries an index which takes a value
of 0 if the average length of union contract is a year or less, 1 if it is from 1 - 3
years and 2 if it is greater than 3 years. The mean of this index across OECD
countries was 0.94 for 1985 - 1995, suggesting a mean contract length greater
than a year.
There is much less evidence on the non-unionised sector, partly because the
most common source of data are panel data sets (the PSID for the US, or the
21BHPS for the UK) which typically collect their data annually so necessarily
miss any sub-annual wage setting. However there does seem a consensus in the
literature that most wages are set annually. For example, Taylor (1998), for
the US, writes that "setting nominal wages at a ￿xed level for more than several
quarters and usually for as long as a year appears to be just as prevalent for
workers who are not in unions, or do not have formal employment contracts,
as for union workers with employment contracts". Smith (2000), referring to
the UK, notes that "pay negotiation in the United Kingdom typically occur
at annual intervals, and pay awards are often made every 12 months even for
workers who are not covered by collective bargaining" and Brown et al (2004)
state that the annual wage settlement is "the principal source of pay change for
most employees in Britain". This is consonant with estimates of the degree of
wage stickiness (reviewed in Taylor, 1998)) using aggregate data which typically
￿nd the average length of time between wage changes to be greater than one
year.
Because we assume the length of nominal contracts is ￿xed at one year while
we vary in￿ ation from 0% to 10% our model is subject to a version of the Lucas
critique. Wouldn￿ t agents change their wage setting behaviour as steady state
in￿ ation varies? So an important empirical question is the degree to which
the contract period changes with steady state in￿ ation. Taylor (1998) writes
than the average contract period fell to one year (our baseline value) during the
great in￿ ation of the 1970s, when average in￿ ation was well above the range we
consider in this paper. Looking across the OECD, Groth and Johansson (2004)
￿nd their index variable was 0.78 in the period 1975 - 85, still consistent with an
average contract length above a year, and rose to 0.94 in the next ten years when
average in￿ ation was lower. So this suggests that modelling nominal contracts
as ￿xed at one year over a range of in￿ ation from 0 - 10% as we do in this paper
is, if anything, a conservative assumption and we could expect contracts to be
longer now average in￿ ation is low.
Can we understand this surprising rigidity of the contract length theoreti-
cally? We have analyzed this case extensively in previous work (Graham and
Snower, 2004). There, rather than treating the contract period as exogenous,
we allow households to choose the length of their wage contract period, assum-
ing that there is a ￿xed cost to changing wages. To calibrate this ￿xed cost we
assume that wages are set for one year at an in￿ ation rate of 5%, on the basis
that this is the average level of US in￿ ation over the past 20 years. We ￿nd
the ￿xed cost is large. This should not be very surprising since it represents
much more than a negotiation cost (e.g. the cost of the time spent negotiating,
22the expected cost of a breakdown in negotiations, etc.), as wage adjustments are
typically accompanied by performance and salary reviews.
Because this cost is large, the e⁄ect of endogenising the contract length was
minimal over a range of 0% - 10% in￿ ation, though as in￿ ation increases above
10% the e⁄ect may become rapidly larger. Further, the e⁄ect of endogenisation
is to strengthen the tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and real variables for rates of
in￿ ation less than the reference level of 5%. Since the costs of in￿ ation decrease
with in￿ ation, the household is less willing to pay the ￿xed cost so the contract
period lengthens and the tradeo⁄s become stronger.
Our assumption of Taylor contracts, without intra-contract indexation, in-
stead of Fisher contracts, is similarly open to the Lucas critique. First note
that our model of annual nominal contracts nests annual indexation since wages
are optimally reset each year. Only indexation within the annual contract pe-
riod would a⁄ect our results. The empirical evidence on indexation is striking,
Card (1986), writing about a period when average in￿ ation was well over the
top of the range we consider, writes that "perhaps no more than 10% of all
US workers are covered by cost-of-living provisions". This surprising result is
because indexation is only observed in union contracts, and, as Card (1983) re-
ports, only in around 60% of these, and "escalation provisions are rare in the
non-union sector". Further, while one can ￿nd evidence of quarterly COLA￿ s,
the vast majority seem to be annual (Kaufman and Woglom, 1986, Vroman,
1985). More recently, Christo￿des and Leung (2003), looking at Canadian data
from 1976 - 1999, write that "very few contracts contain COLA clauses".
So while wage indexation is a feature of very high in￿ ation rates (Marinakis,
1997) it seems largely absent over the range of in￿ ation we consider. The
decision of whether to index or not is very similar to the choice of contract length,
and most models that attempt to explain why indexation is not observed (e.g.
Ball (1988), and Calmfors and Johansson (2002) for a general review) assume
indexation has a ￿xed cost. Exceptions are Danziger (1988) and Mukerji and
Tallon (2004) who show that, if agents are uncertainty averse, they will choose
not to index wage contracts even if there are no ￿xed costs of doing so.
6 Concluding comments
We have shown that the interaction of staggered wage contracts with hyperbolic
discounting leads to in￿ ation having signi￿cant long run e⁄ects on real variables.
What are the implications for monetary policy and macroeconomic analysis? We
address these in turn.
23As to the optimal in￿ ation rate, ￿rst note that output at zero in￿ ation is not
￿rst-best optimal due to imperfect competition. As in￿ ation increases, output
(and hence consumption) and employment increase, and real money balances
fall (as a consequence of the in￿ ation tax). The ￿rst increases the utility of
households; the second and third decrease it. As the nominal interest rate
tends to zero, the third e⁄ect dominates giving the Friedman rule. For positive
rates of in￿ ation, the relative magnitude of these three e⁄ects will depend on
the calibration of the model. We leave a detailed analysis of implications of our
model for monetary policy for future work.
According to the new Neoclassical Synthesis, unemployment can be divided
into structural and cyclical components, where structural unemployment or the
NAIRU depends on supply-side factors such as productivity growth and the de-
gree of imperfect competition, while cyclical unemployment depends on demand-
side factors such as those associated with monetary policy swings. If we de￿ne
the Phillips curve as the relation between in￿ ation and real macro activity that
results from changes in monetary policy, then the new Neoclassical Synthesis
implies that the Phillips curve tradeo⁄ exists in the short-run but not in the
long-run. This approach suggested that demand- and supply-side shocks could
be distinguished econometrically by examining whether they were short- or long-
lived, see, for example, Blanchard and Quah (1989). Our analysis calls these
views into question. If monetary policy can have long-term e⁄ects on real vari-
ables, unemployment cannot be decomposed into cyclical and structural compo-
nents; the concept of a NAIRU needs to be reconsidered.
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